How does metaphysics affect education?

167 The metaphysics of Dasein and the basic events of world formation in Heidegger László Tengelyi After the publication of the first half of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger continued to work for years on the research project from which his main work grew. The university lectures that he holds in Marburg in 1927 are based on the concern of fully working out the third chapter of the first part of Being and Time1 (or presenting it in a new version2) or the second part of the work, the destruction of traditional ontology - and especially the edge part - to design. However, the continuation of the work does not leave the original design unchanged. From the Kant lecture on Heidegger held in the winter semester of 1927/1928, 3 a new interest in metaphysics became noticeable in him.4 Already at this time the problem of metaphysics was linked with that of anthropology.5 The interweaving of these Both tendencies together lead to a “metaphysics of Dasein”, which sets itself the task of working out “the metaphysics of finitude in man” .6 However, the changes mentioned so far are more of a shift in emphasis than the basic intentions of being and time in no way contradict. In 1928, however, Heidegger's thinking experienced a radical change that resulted in a more comprehensive change in the original research project. It turns out that the metaphysics we are looking for goes beyond fundamental ontology. In the last Marburg lecture, which was given under the title Metaphysical Beginnings of Logic in the outcome of Leibniz in the summer semester of 1928, the outlines of a new type of investigation - not to say: discipline - emerged before our eyes, which, according to Heidegger's current view, are drawn out should form the complete metaphysics with fundamental ontology. It is an investigation that is called "Metontology". Although this name is no longer used in later lectures from the period 1927-1930, the idea of ​​a two-part metaphysics persists in the following years. From a metontological perspective, Heidegger addresses the problem of worldview in his Freiburg lecture from the winter semester of 1928/1929. But the metontological point of view also determines the train of thought in the great lecture of 1929/1930 on The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics: World - Finiteness - Loneliness (or Isolation), 7 in which "the basic occurrence of the formation of the world" is made the central theme. In the following, the connection between the newly developed metaphysics of Dasein and the fundamental events of world formation presented in this lecture will be examined in more detail. 1. The idea of ​​metontology From 1928 onwards, Heidegger clearly saw that the metaphysics he was looking for could not be reduced to an investigation of beings as beings or, in other words, of the being of beings. He comes to the insight that metaphysics also has to ask another question, which also relates to beings, but does not concern beings as such, but rather the beings as a whole. It is about a totality of beings that Heidegger understands as the world. The metaphysics sought by Heidegger thus proves that Heidegger's metaphysics of Dasein is biaxial: one of the two axes is marked in it by the concept of being, the other by the concept of world. Being still remains a matter of fundamental ontology; the exploration of the world, on the other hand, is given over to a new type of investigation, namely metontology. What does the unusual expression “metontology” mean? 8 The prefix “Met (a) -” does not refer to a meta-science. It is by no means an investigation into the formal structure of all possible ontologies. The term “metontology” in Heidegger rather indicates a “change” (μεταβολή) of fundamental ontology. In other words, the prefix “Met (a) -” makes it clear that a “tendency” to “an original metaphysical transformation” 9 belongs to fundamental ontology. It is about “the inner necessity that ontology strikes back to where it started” .10 What is meant is the “primordial phenomenon of human existence”: the fact that “what is 'human' understands being” .11 This primordial phenomenon According to Heidegger, it is complex in itself. In the lecture The Basic Problems of Phenomenology from the summer semester of 1927, one of these layers was already discussed under the name “ontological difference ”.12 Heidegger can now content himself with a brief reference to“ realizing the difference between being and being ”. 13 Metontology, however, has to do with a different layer of the primordial phenomenon of the understanding of being. It grows out of the insight into the facticity and contingency of the fact of understanding of being. It says in the text: “[...] the possibility that there is being in understanding presupposes the factual existence of Dasein, and this in turn the factual existence of nature. Precisely in the horizon of the radically posed problem of being it becomes clear that all of this is only visible and can only be understood as being if a possible totality of beings is already there. ”14 170 From this it becomes evident that - not unlike Husserl's phenomenologically applied metaphysics, for example In the Cartesian meditations or the research manuscripts from the late period - Heidegger's Metaphysics of Dasein can also be described as a metaphysics of accidental facticity. From the above lines it also appears that metontology is in a certain sense even more fundamental than fundamental ontology. The basic idea is unmistakable: every understanding of being is tied to the condition that a possible totality of beings is already there. But the understanding of being is the basis of fundamental ontology; Metontology, on the other hand, as it is expressly stated in the text, “deals with beings as a whole” .15 For this reason, metontology can be viewed as an investigation into the condition to which the possibility of fundamental ontology is bound. However, we must clearly see that in another sense metontology presupposes fundamental ontology. Because it arises from an original metaphysical transformation of fundamental ontology. Metontology itself is not an ontology; Rather, it is a “metaphysical ontic” .16 However, it is “not a summary ontic in the sense of a general science that empirically compiles the results of the individual sciences into a so-called worldview in order to then derive a world and life view” .17 One “Inductive metaphysics” of this kind, which offers nothing other than just a “summation of ontic knowledge” 18, is expressly rejected by Heidegger. For this reason, metontology for its part is “only possible on the basis and in the perspective of radical ontological problems and in agreement with them” .19 These considerations show that fundamental ontology and metontology are mutually dependent. Heidegger tries to define this relationship more closely by not only mentioning a “change” from fundamental ontology to metontology, but also by mentioning a certain “turn ”.20 What is meant here is that“ the ontology itself becomes metaphysical Ontik, in which it is always inexpressible, runs back expressly ”.21 This passage raises the question of whether the turn that is brought up here for the first time is identical to the turn of which Heidegger in later writings such as in “Letter about 'Humanism'”. 22 It seems to me that this is by no means a different turn, but that the conclusions Heidegger draws from it at the end of the 1920s do not coincide with the conclusions that he made from it a little later, from the lecture “From the essence of truth” 23 given for the first time in 1930. What I mean by this is that Heidegger has a turn in his eye, which basically urges from the outset to question the “transcendental” character of fundamental ontology24, but that this possibility is not seized in our epoch. Rather, in the second half of the 1920s, Heidegger remains committed to an approach that can still be called transcendental philosophy. In the entire history of philosophy - not only in modern times - he now discovers a "pull on the 'subject'" 25 and relies all the more on this tendency as he is at the same time convinced that the subject, the ego, the consciousness, which in metaphysics “is just not being questioned” 26, that is, remains in its being without further determination. In addition, towards the end of the 1920s, Heidegger attached fundamental importance to the freedom of existence and even spoke of an “original productivity of the 'subject'” .27 If we only pay attention to these endeavors, we are tempted, Heidegger's thinking in the period from 1927 to 1930 not only as a transcendental philosophy, but as a metaphysics of subjectivity. Such labeling alone would be superficial and misleading in its superficiality. In truth, the idea of ​​metontology by no means nourishes tendencies that urge a metaphysics of subjectivity. On the contrary, the idea of ​​metontology rather indicates a break with such tendencies in that it emphasizes the respective contingent facticity character of the fact of understanding of being. In 1928 Heidegger drafted a two-part metaphysics in which metontology relocated fundamental ontology to the basis of original and inalienable facts. If the concept of reason plays a central role in Heidegger's thinking in this period, it is only because Heidegger - in contrast to a tradition based on Aristotle - wants to show that the original facts of metaphysics cannot be traced back to primary causes and principles can. The definition of freedom as the “ground of the ground” 28 certainly expresses an intensification and exaltation of the metaphysics of freedom, with freedom being understood as a transcendence in the sense of existence transcending itself towards a world. But the meaning of the formula mentioned does not yet go into it. The expression "reason of the reason" also refers to the depth of all foundations of beings as a whole. For freedom as the ground of the ground is emphatically an ab ground.29 Heidegger's aim is to trace back all foundations of beings as a whole to freedom, which for its part can never become dominant. Heidegger therefore looks at every attempt to found - or justify - the being as a whole through initial causes and principles with a critical eye. But in our epoch his critical attitude towards tradition is not yet combined with the endeavor to “overcome” the metaphysics of László Tengelyi 173. Certainly, his concern is not simply with correcting or adjusting the metaphysical tradition, but rather with reducing it to the experiences on which it is based; but this dismantling - the "destruction" of traditional ontology - is clearly used in our time to build a new metaphysics. This, in spite of everything, on the whole affirmative relationship to metaphysics as such is a distinguishing feature of our epoch in Heidegger's life work. We have to keep this peculiarity in mind in order to understand metontology in its relation to ontotheology.30 In his 1926 lecture on basic concepts of ancient philosophy, Heidegger outlined the main lines of the basic structure which he later called the "onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics ”, 31 without using this term. In this lecture he points to a duplication of the First Philosophy in Aristotle. Indeed, Aristotle determines the science he is looking for, which is later to be named "Metaphysics" in the peripatetic school and which he himself only calls First Philosophy, on the one hand as a science of beings as such and in general (Γ 1–2: Ontology), but on the other hand as a science of the highest and excellent being (Ε 1: Theology). In the last Marburg lecture, Heidegger invokes this “double concept of philosophy”, 32 in order to demonstrate the need to supplement the question of beings as such with the question of beings as a whole. So he tries to maintain and continue the Aristotelian duplication of philosophy in his own work. He even thinks that the fact that the general science of beings coincides with Aristotle's special science of the highest being, the necessity for him to supplement the question of beings as such with the question of beings in metaphysics of existence in Heidegger 174 expresses the whole.33 Here Heidegger's positive connection to the metaphysical tradition becomes evident. The text of the last Marburg lecture suggests at least a structural correspondence between Aristotelian theology and metontology.34 Just as with Aristotle, Heidegger divides metaphysics into two parts, in that the fundamental ontology is supplemented by a metontology.35 Of course, purely follows from this structural correspondence in no way that metontology should be understood as a theology, even if only in the Aristotelian sense of this word. It is true that Heidegger brings the two disciplines - or types of investigation - to a common denominator by summarizing them under the title “Science of the Overpowering.” 36 In a footnote, he even goes so far as to define the basic character of the overpowering as “holiness”. 37 At the same time, however, he leaves no doubt that being as holiness cannot be regarded as the object of that ontic and positive science for which, according to the testimony of a famous lecture in 1927, he considers theology to be.38 As a phenomenologist, Heidegger remains one "Methodological atheism" 39 committed. It is only a consequence of this methodological rigor that metontology has only the world as its object. In the years 1928–1930, the newly discovered problematic of metontology provided an impetus for the elaboration of a metaphysical draft, which can still claim our attention today. The focus of this draft is what Heidegger describes in the last chapter of his lecture from 1929/1930 on The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics: World - Finiteness - Loneliness as the basic occurrence of the formation of the world. László Tengelyi 175 2. The basic occurrence of the formation of the world The path that leads to the understanding of this basic occurrence is determined by new insights that relate to four subject areas: First, the relationship between philosophy and science changes; secondly, philosophy is newly understood in its relation to world view; thirdly, Heidegger's conception of truth is changing; fourthly, an anthropological approach to the metaphysics of existence is gained, which ultimately leads to the thesis: “Man is world-forming” 40 or, more precisely, “being there in man is world-forming” .41 The changes in these four subject areas are briefly described below be summarized. As far as the relationship between philosophy and science is concerned, the basic ideas that were formulated in Being and Time are carried on in our epoch. Accordingly, philosophy differs from the individual sciences in that it deals with the being of beings, while the individual sciences always only refer to beings. This clear difference is not obscured by the fact that the individual sciences are necessarily based on regional ontologies: They cut out a certain area of ​​beings from the whole of the world by defining the being of the beings that are of interest to them through their basic concepts. This concept, which was already drafted in Sein und Zeit, will be further developed in the Freiburg lecture Introduction to Philosophy from the winter semester 1928/1929 by coining a new concept of mathematics. This lecture says: “Modern physics is mathematical because in a certain way the a priori is determined.Every experiment (together with the measuring instruments used in it) is set up and interpreted in the light of a previous determination of the being of beings. "42 The Metaphysics of Dasein in Heidegger 176 Or at another point:" Mathematical physics has therefore become a real science, because through the character of the mathematical it determines in advance the constitution of being of that which belongs to a natural thing. "43 How little the delimitation of a framework of being by individual scientific basic concepts makes the philosophical determination of being in general and in general dispensable is shown by Heidegger when that the individual sciences get into crises from time to time. In these crises it becomes clear that the regional ontologies on which the individual sciences are based are inherently opaque and their interrelationship is confusing. From this arises the task of philosophy to examine the basic concepts of the individual sciences ontologically and to derive the connection between the individual regions of being from the general idea of ​​being in general. In Being and Time, this task falls to fundamental ontology. However, it can only be formulated more clearly as soon as the being as a whole is thematized from a metontological perspective. The fact that metontology connects this task with the problem of the world and thus expands fundamental ontology into a metaphysics of existence does not in and of itself change anything in the relationship between philosophy and science. If the Freiburg lecture of 1928/1929 brought about a fundamental change in this relationship, it was for a different reason and in a different respect. She asks the question: “Is philosophy a science at all?” 44 and she answers this question: “No, philosophy is not a science.” 45 That is the new thing about the relationship between philosophy and science. However, Heidegger does not mean to deny Husserl's concern to establish philosophy as a “strict science”, one way or another.46 In his eyes, scientific philosophy is still nothing contradictory, not a “wooden iron”; Rather, it is something tautological, similar to a “rounded circle” .47 Philosophy is “more original than any science because all science is rooted in philosophy and only arises from it” .48 However, philosophy does not only pose the fundamental ontological question according to the being of beings, but also the metontological question of beings as a whole, it cannot be a science - not even an ontological one in contrast to all ontic ones. Because: "A science of beings as a whole [...] is essentially impossible." 49 Every science is by its nature positive individual science. Philosophy also differs from science in that it maintains a completely different relationship with worldview than science. This brings us to our second subject area, which is closely related to the first. In the Freiburg lecture of 1928/1929, Heidegger took up the problem of worldview as it was dealt with before him from Dilthey to Jaspers. But one has to see clearly that in the 1920s - and actually later as well - he just as clearly dismissed the idea of ​​Weltanschauung philosophy as did Husserl in his Logos essay on "Philosophy as Strict Science". In the Freiburg lecture of 1928/1929 he also stated unequivocally: “It cannot be the task and goal of philosophy to develop a worldview […]”. 50 But the idea of ​​metontology, with its focus on the question of the world, poses that too Problem of worldview in a new light. The last Marburg lecture said: "There is [...] a philosophical worldview, but it is not a result of philosophy and is not attached to it as a practical instruction for life, rather it lies in philosophizing itself." 51 The metaphysics of existence at Heidegger 178 This approach is developed in the Freiburg lecture of 1928/1929. Heidegger takes the view that philosophizing as such is based on a certain worldview. What is meant is a worldview that emerges from a radical break with "mythical thinking". Heidegger describes this thinking in connection with the second volume of Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.52 The basic attitude that is characteristic of mythical thinking characterizes Heidegger through a striving for salvation or security. According to him, this striving remains in religious faith even after the collapse of mythical worlds. Only philosophizing breaks from the start with the need for rescue and security. With the birth of philosophy, being-in-the-world changes and with it the behavior of Dasein towards other beings. One could say: A new basic metontological attitude arises, 53 which first of all makes something like science possible; 54 for science had no place in mythical thinking.55 With regard to this new basic metontological attitude, Heidegger claims that philosophy is the bearer of a world view, which is not about recovery and security, but about an attitude of existence in the world as a whole. One can certainly see in this turning away from the idea of ​​a scientific philosophy a momentous step on Heidegger's thought career. But one has to note that this step in the Freiburg lecture of 1929/1930 arises from a factual insight. Heidegger understands that the metontological basic attitude that makes science and research possible in the first place cannot itself be characterized as a scientific basic attitude without the train of thought moving in a circle. That is why he tries to characterize this metontological basic attitude as the result of an ideological draft which owes its weight and its peculiar nature to the break with a previous world view. The third subject area in which a new insight arises is that of truth, 56 which was already understood in § 44 of Being and Time as discovery and disclosure, and consequently as unconcealment or revelation. In this area too, almost everything remained unchanged at the end of the 1920s. Heidegger repeatedly tries to show that the original place of truth is not the statement, but the revelation of the world that precedes the predication and the logos (in the sense of the statement). Again and again he adds that this pre-predicative - or pre-logical - revelation, which according to him is a condition of possibility both for the truth and for the falseness of the statement and therefore - especially in its form as the unconcealment of being - also as " transcendental truth ”57, cannot be understood as an approximation of the idea to the thing itself, i.e. not as adaequatio rei et intellectus, but simply from the appearing from itself of the being and its being, i.e. from its self- showing-in-yourself results. It is certainly a remarkable innovation of the Freiburg lecture of 1928/1929 that it puts the problem of truth in the perspective of being with us. Heidegger shows that existence does not always and necessarily include being with, but that this being with is at the same time by its nature “always and necessarily a vision of the truth ”.58 This idea of ​​a shared truth is an important addition to the conception of truth about being and time But it does not yet bring about a substantive change in this view. In the lecture of 1929/1930, on the other hand, the conception of truth about being and time is changed at an essential point. Here Heidegger presents his new insight in a form that results from his connection to the Aristotelian theory of the statement in De interpretatione. Aristotle differentiates between true and false and affirmative (positive) and negative (negative) statements. It makes sense to orientate oneself in the interpretation of the truth primarily to the affirmative (positive) true statement in order to understand the three other possible combinations in the outcome of this excellent case. But Heidegger now recognizes what is deceptive in this approach. He says: “This type of logic approach to positive, true judgment is justified within certain limits, but precisely for this reason it becomes the cause of the basic deception, as if it were a matter of simply applying the other possible forms of the statement to the above - in addition Respectively. I myself have become a victim of this deception - at least in the implementation of the interpretation of λόγος - in 'Being and Time' (cf. as being excluded from this deception 'Being and Time' p. 222 and p. 285f.). "59 To gauge the importance of this self-critical remark, just think that equating the truth with the unconcealment of the world robs the judgment of the peculiar latitude in which it can be true or false. The judgment is not a mere expression of experienced revelation, but an opinion on what was immediately questioned. In this thought we can recognize the basic motive of the criticism that Ernst Tugendhat exercised at the end of the 1960s on Heidegger's phenomenological concept of truth. The lecture from 1929/1930, which Tugendhat was of course not yet able to know at the end of the 1960s, largely takes into account the quite justified claim on which this criticism is based: or to decide about inappropriateness, more precisely, in order to be able to behave at all in this 'either-or', the person making a statement must in advance have some leeway for the comparative backward movement of the 'either-or' , the truth or falsehood, namely a scope within which the being itself, about which it is to be stated, is evident. ”60 From this it follows for Heidegger not only that the truth is based“ in a freedom for beings as such ” , 61 but at the same time that it is a matter of being free, which can be bound by beings and thus imposes a commitment on itself. In the lecture of 1929/1930 it says: “This behavior, which is expressive in everything, and which is based on it, which happens against something that is binding, is what we call a basic behavior: being free in an original sense.” 62 A basic behavior of this kind, like any other Behavior towards the world is peculiar to man; for, according to Heidegger, the animal does not relate to the world, it only behaves in its environment and is completely dazed by this environment. This juxtaposition of humans and animals is a signpost from which the anthropological approach to the metaphysics of existence in the lecture of 1929/1930 can primarily be guided. This brings us to the fourth and last subject area in which new insights emerged at the end of the 1920s. Already in the introduction to his Freiburg lecture Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) and the philosophical problems of the present from the summer semester of 1929, Heidegger tried to identify the "tendency towards metaphysics" characteristic of his time with an equally pronounced and also for his time characteristic “tendency towards anthropology ”.63 In the following lecture from 1929/1930 he goes into detail on the difference between animals and humans. So, in a certain sense of the word, he appropriates an anthropological approach to metaphysics. It is, however, an anthropology that clearly differs from the contemporary endeavors of Scheler, Löwith, Die Metaphysik des Daseins in Heidegger, 182 Plessner, Gehlen or Cassirer. For with Heidegger, the metontological perspective also remains the guiding principle for anthropological considerations. In other words, the lecture of 1929/1930 is about using the three theses “The stone is worldless”, “The animal is poor in the world” and “Man is world-forming” to grasp the connection between different regions of being. The anthropological approach here only leads to a certain weighting of the regions of being considered. In contrast, for example, to Nicolai Hartmann's contemporary layer theory, which on the one hand emphasizes the dependence of living, emotional and spiritual being on the lowest layer of lifeless matter, but on the other hand assigns a “categorical novelty” to the higher layers Heidegger assumes that only humans can relate to beings as a whole and that is why only they can be considered as the starting point and supporting basis of a metontological design. Because a metontological design is a design of the world; but the world only exists for man: only man can be regarded as world-forming. According to Heidegger, it is important to understand that "so-called regions of being are not nested next to one another or one above the other or one behind the other, but are only as they are, within and out of one rule of the world." 64 In this context, it is crucial to that material being "has the character of worldlessness" 65 and that the animal is absorbed in its environment without relating to the world. This leads to an important conclusion: "So nature - neither the lifeless nor the living - is by no means the board and the lowest layer on which the human being would be piled up in order to drive mischief on it." 66 Heidegger thus shows every layer ontology Hartmann type by hand. László Tengelyi 183 Instead, he assumes that a metontological design has to be based on the basic occurrence of the formation of the world, which is peculiar to human existence and characterizes it from the outset. It becomes clear here that Heidegger turns to the basic occurrence of the formation of the world, which is always underway in human existence, because he needs it as a basis and support for his metontological project. In doing so, he gives the connection between the regions of being an anthropological weighting. For Heidegger, it is not the inner structure of nature that provides the guideline for determining the relationship between these regions of being, but rather the process of human formation of the world. The formation of regional ontologies in the individual sciences is certainly not irrelevant for this process, but it is also not the only relevant one. More fundamental is the emergence of a worldview, whatever it may be. However, the break with the striving for rescue and security and the struggle for an attitude in the midst of beings as a whole are a prerequisite for the results of the individual sciences to become decisive for the basic events of world formation. In addition, the process of human formation of the world according to Heidegger presupposes the binding nature of truth. For him, the world is not only a concept of totality, but also includes the idea of ​​accessibility and the revelation of beings; In other words, it is not so much the being in the whole, but rather the unconcealment of the being in the whole. Only the unconcealment and revelation of beings only takes on the form of truth when a being free for beings is expressed, which can be bound and thus imposes a liability on itself. This transformed conception of truth is probably the reason why Heidegger asserted in his last Marburg lecture that “the question of ethics” cannot be posed in the fundamentals of lontology, but only in metontology.67 That The word “ethics” at this point obviously does not mean a theory of morality as a social system of rules, but rather a reflection on the possibilities of developing a thoughtful attitude in the midst of the revelation of beings as a whole. But not only the regional ontologies underlying the individual sciences and the world views of mythical-religious or philosophical-scientific stamping play a role in the basic events of human world formation, and there is also not only an ethics of a thoughtful attitude in the clearing of the world, Instead, the fundamental ontological question also only reaches “its clear problematic” “in the context of the world problem”. 68 Nowhere is Heidegger so close to discovering the real basis of a non-traditional metaphysics than in this examination of the fundamental events of the formation of the world in existence of the human. The metontological draft, which was developed in the years 1928–1930, does not mean turning away from the sciences, but merely tries to integrate their contribution to the process of human formation of the world into a larger whole. The picture of this whole is certainly not complete at this time, but in retrospect it can be supplemented by areas that Heidegger only dealt with in detail later, such as the world-forming role of art and poetry in our epoch is seldom mentioned, already takes into account in the following years. However, this should not hide the fact that Heidegger's metontological foundation of metaphysics is marked by a peculiar fragility. The reason for this fragility lies undoubtedly in the “turn” from which the metontological concern emerges in the first place, but which with a certain necessity drives it out beyond the transcendental foundation of metontology. Towards László Tengelyi, it drives an event-based thinking that undoubtedly has its inner justification. The unfortunate thing about it, however, is that this event-based thinking is used for several decades in the service of a project relating to the history of being, which, despite great insights into detail, on the whole comes dangerously close to an all-too-traditional metaphysics of history. Only in the very last phase of his career - around 1955 - did Heidegger arrive at a sobered and purified event-based thinking that abandons the overcoming of metaphysics and turns to the things themselves in a return to phenomenology, without, however, on the once attempted metontological foundation of Metaphysics to come back again. The metaphysics of existence in Heidegger